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Scrutiny Instead of Silence
Barbara A. Peterson Dr.
Abstract
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) argue for alternative behavioral guidelines than those currently being 
used in many social justice courses. Their alternative is to silence or constrain privileged voices so that 
marginalized voices have ample space to be heard and taken seriously. This raises the concern that 
silencing any group of persons runs too great a risk of alienating them to the point where their mis-
trust of the “other” is exacerbated rather than assuaged. This response suggests that, instead of silenc-
ing or even constraining privileged voices in the classroom, we may want to move toward developing 
in students the attitude that all claims and assertions, especially those that society often accepts as true 
without question, must undergo critical scrutiny. If we can teach students that a well- informed belief 
is one that is continually subject to critical analysis, and we can guide them in developing and under-
standing that our social positionality leads us to favor certain views and perspectives over others due, 
in large part, to the inequity in our social structures, perhaps we can open our students’ minds to the 
value and worth of marginalized claims and views.
This article is a response to:
Sensoy, Ö. and DiAngelo, R. (2014). Respect differences? Challenging the common guidelines in 
social justice education. Democracy & Education, 22(2), Article 1. Available online at:  
http://democracyeducationjournal.org/home/vol22/iss2/1/
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) argue that the behav-ioral guidelines used in many social justice courses to help ensure fairness and equality of opportunity in class-
room discussions actually help maintain unjust power relations 
that privilege the dominant and silence the oppressed. Their 
examples illustrate how such guidelines can have the opposite effect 
they intended. While I sympathize and agree with much of what the 
authors claim, I have some concerns. Instead of silencing or even 
constraining privileged voices in the classroom, we may want to 
move toward developing in students the attitude that all beliefs and 
assertions, especially those that society often accepts as true 
without question, must be backed up with good reasons, evidence, 
and arguments.
According to Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014), the commonly 
used classroom guidelines in social justice courses “increase 
unequal power relations in the classroom” rather than create “an 
equitable and open classroom space” (p. 2). In their experience as 
social justice educators, they
have found it helpful to strategically constrain several of the most 
commonsense community- building guidelines including: sharing 
opinions, affirming everyone’s perspectives, assuring everyone feels 
heard, eliciting personal connections and feelings about the course 
material and emotional responses to course texts, co- constructing the 
curriculum, and sharing airtime. (p. 2).
They claim that those who enjoy privilege in mainstream 
society by having their voices heard and beliefs count more than 
the marginalized ought not to enjoy such privilege in their class-
rooms. Instead, their dominant perspectives and claims ought to be 
limited. Just how limited, we are not told. But we can assume that it 
is enough to allow those who are typically silenced to express their 
beliefs and discuss their experiences in a space where their com-
ments will be heard.
In their paper, Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) provide an 
example where a student told an invited panel member that she did 
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not appreciate being asked to accept homosexuality because she 
believes such a “lifestyle” to be immoral (p. 3). Sensoy and 
DiAngelo argue that allowing such comments “reinforce problem-
atic discursive effects by legitimizing the idea that the conversation 
is equalizing only when it also includes dominant voices” (p. 3). 
Advocating that all views be given a voice is not, however, just an 
attempt at “fairness” (p. 3), as Sensoy and DiAngelo claim. Rather, 
it can be attempt at developing “critical spaces” (Giroux, 1983) that 
teach students to deliberate critically about beliefs often held as 
unquestionably true without considering the arguments and 
evidence against such beliefs.
Restricting dominant views is risky. While it certainly has its 
benefits, as explicated by Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014), it legiti-
mizes the practice of teachers deciding which perspectives, 
ideologies, and attitudes to allow in class and which to silence.  
This sounds too much like teachers of more mainstream courses 
silencing marginalized voices or privileging the views of the 
dominant voices in society. Both are cases in which the teacher 
controls the political debate in the classroom and helps shape the 
attitudes and perspectives taken in class discussions. Neither 
allows students the opportunity to, or teaches them to, effectively 
address sensitive and controversial issues, nor do they help 
students work through the very real ignorance, bias, and discrimi-
nation that exists in their beliefs about themselves and others.  
In my experience as a high school teacher, when people such as 
White, successful students, who are accustomed to having their 
assertions taken seriously in class, are ignored or made to feel their 
beliefs are morally suspect, they quickly learn to play by the rules of 
the teacher. As one student told me, they learn to say in class that all 
White men are bad and women and natives are good so that they 
can get a good grade. When privileged voices are silenced in class, 
those students who enjoy such privilege in society may not, as 
Sensoy and DiAngelo hope, come to see that their views ought to 
be altered. Rather, they may learn that they ought to wait to express 
their views outside of the class where the vast majority in society 
will support them.
Yet, Sensoy and DiAngelo’s (2014) claims cannot be so easily 
dismissed. By opening the debate of whether same- sex relation-
ships ought to be given equal rights and privileges in society as 
heterosexual relationships, we risk putting the worth of gays, 
lesbians, homosexuals, and bisexuals into question. Similarly, if we 
allow debate on women’s equality to men, we risk putting women’s 
worth into question. No student should be put into the position of 
having to defend worth as a human being. Doing so not only has 
significant moral concerns but epistemic ones as well. Students 
who are presumed inferior until they can prove otherwise are not 
given an equal voice in class; their comments are not taken as 
seriously or as “true” as those offered by privileged students.
As liberal democratic and critical theorists argue, schools 
often mirror structural inequalities found in society that unfairly 
privilege some voices over others (Fletcher, 2000, pp. 50– 57). 
Allowing such comments that question the worth of people in class 
would appear to further entrench this unjust privileging. In short, if 
we encourage or even consent to having our students question, for 
example, women’s worth, we may help perpetuate the unjust 
silencing of women’s voices and thus help to maintain their 
oppression in schools and society.
However, taking questions about a person’s worth out of the 
domain of school discussions does not permit sexist, racist, 
homophobic, and otherwise prejudiced views to be challenged.  
As Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) admit, critics of their views may ask 
whether it is sometimes “important to surface these perspectives so 
that they may be critically reflected upon” (p. 3). The authors’ answer is 
threefold. First, they claim that marginalized voices need to be given 
priority and sometimes exclusivity in order to help “dislodge” (p. 4)  
the often unquestioned and pervasive dominant, mainstream views. 
Second, because marginalized voices are typically ignored and 
perceived as unworthy, privileged voices “can have the effect of 
hijacking the discussion” (p. 4). Third, “institutional weight” (p. 4)  
goes to the privileged views and thus they can, even if unintentionally, 
silence the voices of the underprivileged.
While I agree that deeply embedded, structural bias signifi-
cantly and unfairly favors dominant ideologies, I wonder if instead 
of trying to be “fair” to all views, teachers should clearly name the 
issue of unjust power hierarchies that exist in society and are 
mirrored in schools. Granted, such naming comes with its own 
difficulties as Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) point out (p. 3). 
However, it seems to be less problematic than silencing a cultural 
group’s voices.
What is needed, it seems, is a way to allow students to engage in 
inquiry about, say, sex equality without putting women in the 
position of having to defend their worth as human beings. It may be 
helpful to note at this point that the question “Are women equal in 
worth to men?” presupposes that men’s worth is unquestioned but 
women’s worth is very much up for debate. Asking “Are women and 
men equal?” however, does not make any such presuppositions. If we 
permit students to talk about sexism, gender oppression, and the 
worth of people, we do not necessarily put women’s worth into 
question. Indeed, women’s studies courses engage students in such 
conversations every day. Inquiring into beliefs about men’s superior-
ity over women, if done skillfully, does not have to cause the further 
entrenchment of women’s oppression. Educators must be sure to set 
up class discussions in such a way that students can deliberate over 
the equality between women and men without starting from the 
assumption that women’s worth is disputable. In any dialectic 
inquiry about sex equality, teachers need to ensure that their female 
students’ contributions are considered as valuable as the contribu-
tions made by the male students. The skillful handling of classroom 
conversations about equality (whether it be sex, race, etc.) does not 
unduly jeopardize the value and worth of any student’s contributions 
to the class discussion.
Unless we provide space for such claims to be critiqued in the 
light of rational inquiry, there is little hope such beliefs will be 
alterable even when there is adequate evidence against them. 
Although the thought of people holding such views that question 
the worth of people is repugnant to many, they are views that, 
unfortunately, millions of people hold as true. Refusing to allow 
students to voice their doubts about, say, the equality of women, 
may teach them that such doubts are unwanted and undesirable in 
a particular classroom. It does not, however, teach them that their 
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beliefs are wrong. Airing oppressive beliefs in the open space of the 
classroom, not in the interest of fairness but with the purpose of 
teaching students to critically assess the worth of all claims, may 
help diminish oppressive beliefs.
Perhaps an answer to providing marginalized voices in the 
classroom an equitable role in class discussions is to teach students 
that all beliefs ought to be subject to rational scrutiny. Paul (2002) 
provides one theoretical framework in which teachers can formu-
late methods of engaging students in critical discussions of what 
more liberal and progressive thinkers often see as racist, sexist, and 
homophobic thinking. Paul claims that critical thinkers are not 
characterized by the beliefs they hold but rather by how they hold 
their beliefs. For Paul, to achieve confidence in our beliefs, we must 
be ever open to re- assessing the epistemic worth of our beliefs from 
various perspectives and worldviews and in light of all available 
evidence and arguments. Indeed, he recommends that we seek out 
and consider the best objection to our views.
Misak, a Peircean scholar, also offers a framework in which 
educators can help ensure that oppressive beliefs and comments are 
critically examined in classes, a worthy goal in social justice courses. 
She agrees with Peirce’s dictum, Let nothing stand in the way of 
inquiry. According to Misak (2004), people must hold beliefs open to 
the experiences of all people. If people hold their beliefs in such a 
way, then they are genuinely interested in arriving at beliefs that 
would meet with all relevant experiences at the hypothetical end of 
inquiry. Aiming to get the right answer, the answer that we would not 
doubt at the end of the day, means not excluding anyone’s experi-
ences that speak to a given belief. As Misak (2000) notes, “the 
open- endedness of inquiry and the commitment to taking other 
perspectives seriously must be preserved if we are to have any hope of 
reaching beliefs which really do account for all experiences and 
argument” (p. 97). Refusing to allow students to discuss particular 
assertions implies that such assertions cannot be reasoned about and 
implies that there may be some infallible source of truth somehow 
beyond them that can easily be thought to be the text, the teacher, or 
the state— probably whoever has the power to insist on them 
learning such beliefs as truths. It risks undermining students’ 
capacities to engage in open- minded and critically deliberative 
inquiry. Thus, although there are some issues that need to be handled 
with great skill and care, to cultivate critically deliberative thinking 
and to help students who hold harmful views about others challenge 
their thinking in a real and meaningful way, educators should permit 
and even encourage students to be open to inquiry.
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) are correct in being skeptical of 
the guidelines that require all beliefs an equal amount of time and 
worth. Such guidelines support not only deeply entrenched, unjust 
social positioning but also supports lazy thinking. If students are 
able to state their views without having the responsibility of defend-
ing them with what they learn to be good evidence, reasons, and 
arguments, we risk teaching them that a subjective approach to 
thinking is an adequate form of critical inquiry, that one opinion is 
as good as another, and that assertions do not have to be critically 
examined by reason, introspection, or mindful open reflection.
Sensoy and DiAngelo (2014) admit that “engaging construc-
tively with alternative perspectives, thinking critically, . . . raising 
critical questions . . . [and] recognizing the power relations 
embedded in positionality” (p. 7−8) are important components of 
educating for social justice. Yet they argue that such capacities are 
not developed using current teaching guidelines that give equal 
time and value to all beliefs because privileged views will continue 
to be privileged and will, in effect, silence voices too often silent. 
Instead of following the guideline of equal time to all views, 
perhaps we should follow what they themselves advocate toward 
the end of their article. Teach students to: “Be willing to grapple 
with challenging ideas . . . [and] recognize how your own social 
positionality . . . informs your perspectives” (p. 8). These guidelines 
seem to afford all students, even those who are privileged, a voice 
while requiring them to critically examine not only the reasons for 
their beliefs but where the beliefs come from, what assumptions are 
associated with them, and how they may be altered in the face of an 
open- minded analysis of opposing evidence.
While I agree with both the goals and the concerns Sensoy and 
DiAngelo (2014) discuss in their article, I believe we can find an 
alternative to silencing or constraining privileged voices, one that 
meets our common goal of raising awareness of structural inequity 
and working against oppression. Having critical thinking or 
critically deliberative inquiry as our goal in social justice courses 
with the pragmatic conception of knowledge as beliefs that meet 
with all experiences, broadly construed, at the hypothetical end of 
inquiry, we may not have to constrain any voices but require all 
students to adopt the habit of engaging in analysis and open- 
minded scrutiny of their beliefs, assumptions, positionality, and 
biases. If we can teach students that a well- informed belief is one 
that is continually subject to modification based on new and 
conflicting evidence, and if we are careful to help them understand 
that we all carry biases that unjustly favor certain views and 
perspectives over others due, in large part, to the inequity in our 
social structures, perhaps we can not only open their minds to the 
value and worth of marginalized claims and views but teach them 
to value certain ways of holding beliefs over stubbornly clinging to 
unexamined assumptions and views. Silencing any group of 
students runs too great a risk of alienating them. And constraining 
the voice of the privileged seems to risk alienating the privileged to 
the point where their mistrust of oppressed groups is exacerbated 
rather than assuaged.
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